Beth Frances Coye

THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AS CONCEIVED BY THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION.

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by

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THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AS CONCEIVED BY THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the field of National Security Policy, a new strategic doctrine was professed in the United States in the 1960's by the New Frontiersmen. As a direct result, unique and different requirements of national security policy were conceived and structured within U.S. foreign policy. These requirements, both military and nonmilitary, as they were conceived and developed throughout the Kennedy administration are the subject of this thesis.

The study begins with brief consideration of the strategy of the National Security Policy of the New Frontiersmen. The embryonic stage (1959-60) is touched upon, and then there is a brief discussion of some of the probable essentials of the strategy as originally conceived.

The next area of research presents chapters on the Kennedy conception of requirements, military and nonmilitary respectively, in the format of composite essays. Requirements are listed and analyzed. In these two chapters a net conception or "image" of such requirements, as asseverated during the entire administration, is the objective.

The succeeding chapters deal with the implementation of these requirements. In a chronological order they approach

more specifically the conceptual requirements. These chapters illustrate: how they (requirements) acted as guideposts for decisions and major programs, how they influenced foreign policy, and how they developed with the passage of time.

Hence, by analysis of these three areas - strategy, requirements and implementation of the requirements - this study tries to establish the essence of the Kennedy concept of national security policy (NSP).

That requirements of NSP were determined by strategy was a fundamental premise of the Kennedy administration. The thesis of this research is that the new forward strategy conceived and implemented by the Kennedy administration determined in turn requirements which were unique to U.S. policy in some respects, suitable to the prevailing conditions of the national system, and inherent to the nature of John F. Kennedy and his New Frontiersmen.

To aid in comprehending in toto the conceptual picture of this thesis, a paradigm of the concept is presented as Appendix A.

CHAPTER II

A NEW STRATEGY: THE KEY TO NEW REQUIREMENTS

A major premise underlying discussion of the national security policies of the New Frontier is that force requirements, or military requirements, are determined by the national strategy. The Hitch (Charles J.) thesis makes this assumption very clear; that is, national security objectives are related to national strategy, strategy to forces, forces to resources, and resources to cost.[1] A further important premise is that there is no such entity as military strategy, in that military strategy cannot be separated from the total national strategy which embodies political, technological, social, economic and psychological factors as well as the military one.

In order to understand the requirements of the Kennedy administration both these premises become of paramount importance. In fact, the first is the key to a major shift in requirments of the New Frontier as opposed to those of the Eisenhower administration. One is alluding here to the adoption of a new mix of strategic postulates in lieu of the massive retaliation doctrine.

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[1]Charles J. Hitch, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems", American Defense Policy, Associates in Political Science, USMA Academy, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 212-17.

In this chapter substantial evidence of this strategy shift is provided; the early phase of Kennedy's strategic ideas is briefly highlighted, and then possible concrete questions which the Kennedy strategists might have raised in developing the strategy are presented.

I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF NEW FRONTIER STRATEGY

The Kennedy administration doctrine (hereafter referred to as the doctrine of flexible response) may be observed in several contexts prior to its manifestation in the first hundred days of the administration. Four of these sources will be examined: Professor Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict; General Maxwell Taylor's The Uncertain Trumpet; John F. Kennedy's Strategy of Peace; and the Nixon-Kennedy 1960 debates.

Dr. Thomas C. Schelling of Harvard is one of the more articulate civilian strategists who spoke out in the last years of the Eisenhower administration. Others include Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Robert E. Osgood, Charles J. Hitch, Bernard Brodie, and Albert Wohlstetter. Schelling's theory of strategy is an excellent base upon which to build the flexible response doctrine. In his Strategy of Conflict Schelling develops key theoretical postulates and ideas which may be inferred as the theses between the lines of the doctrine of flexible response. These would include:

(1) Common as well as conflicting interests are extant among the participants (in the international system of nation-states). There is a relationship of mutual dependence as well as opposition between enemies: "....Pure conflict, in which the interests of two antagonists are completely opposed, is a special case; it would arise in a war of complete extermination, otherwise not even in war. For this reason, 'winning' in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive meaning; it is not winning relative to one's adversary. It means gaining relative to one's own value system."[2]

(2) The means of "gaining" is bargaining, mutual accommodation and avoidance of mutually damaging behavior, ".... if there is any possibility of avoiding a mutually damaging war, of conducting warfare in a way that minimizes damage, or of coercing an adversary by threatening war rather than waging it, the possibility of mutual accommodation is as important as the element of conflict."[3] Such strategy, then, takes the view that most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations. The participants' decisions will interact and be interdependent upon each other.

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[2]Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 4.

[3]Ibid., p. 5.

(3) It is a strategy concerned with potential force:

> This strategy in the sense in which I am using it here - is not concerned with the efficient application of force but with the exploitation of potential force. It is concerned not just with enemies who dislike each other but with partners who distrust or disagree with each other.[4]

(4) A strategy of conflict emphasizes the necessity of credibility, "commitment", of the potential force as well as the necessity of exploring the field of communication with one's enemy.[5]

The highly theoretical parts of Schelling's book, which is structured with game theory in mind, need not be explored. For our purposes the notions mentioned above - unpure conflict as inevitable, emphasis of bargaining and of the application of credible force - are an introduction to the conceptual framework of the doctrine of flexible response. These notions offer a conceptual setting for General Maxwell Taylor's strategy:

General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army, (Ret.), was the military representative of the New Frontier; it was he who stepped into a new position, that of Presidential military advisor, in 1961 after the Bay of Pigs. It was he who, after this painful incident, headed up the task force which revamped

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[4] Ibid., p. 5.

[5] Ibid., p. 77.

the national security organization of the New Frontier. It is his book, The Uncertain Trumpet, published in 1959, which expounds the essentials of the Kennedy doctrine and which is a prologue to many New Frontier programs.

The theme of The Uncertain Trumpet is that the doctrine of massive retaliation is a "great fallacy" and that the strategy of flexible response must replace it:

> It is my belief that Massive Retaliation as a guiding strategic concept has reached a dead end and that there is an urgent need for a reappraisal of our strategic needs. In its heyday, Massive Retaliation could offer our leaders only two choices, the initiation of general nuclear war or compromise and retreat... it has not maintained the Little Peace; that is, peace from disturbances which are little only in comparison with the disaster of general war.[6]

Taylor accents the need for a "capability to react across the entire spectrum of possible challenges, for coping with anything from general atomic war to infiltrations and aggressions such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959."[7] The new strategy would recognize that it is just as necessary to deter or win quickly a limited war as to deter general war. Is this not implementation of Schelling's strategy?

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[6]General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S.A., (Ret.), The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), pp. 5-6.

[7]Ibid., p. 6.

Taylor's book tells an alarming tale of the inner-workings of the Joint Chiefs as the New Look aged. The debate on strategy within the JCS is vividly portrayed by the general and well worth quoting in full:

> The overriding issue which forms the backdrop for all debates on strategy is the conflict between the strategy of Massive Retaliation and that which I have called the strategy of Flexible Response. Since the former was adopted as orthodox official policy in 1953 and has been faithfully implemented in the defense budgets up to the present time, we have spent our dollars consistently to support it....Thus far, no Secretary of Defense has been willing to denounce Flexible Response as a heresy and to excommunicate its supporters. The rival trumpeters have been allowed to play their conflicting notes. As a result, this fundamental schism continues to split the Joint Chiefs of Staff and provides the basic divergence for many of the conflicts within that body.[8] (own underlining)

A chapter on "A New National Military Program" sets forth the guidelines which were soon to be followed by the New Frontier in restructuring national forces. The last chapter suggests many organizational changes within the Defense Establishment, not the least of which is a functional philosophy for the services. This philosophy was, of course, adopted wholeheartedly by President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara.

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[8] Ibid., pp. 117-18.

The notes from "the rival trumpets" were playing loudly by 1960. Senator John F. Kennedy's speech on the floor of the Senate, 14 June 1960, was one very strong composition:

> Our task is to rebuild our strength, and the strength of the free world - to prove to the Soviets that time and the course of history are not on their side, that the balance of world power is not shifting their way - and that therefore peaceful settlement is essential to mutual survival.[9]

The Senator went on to say that our task is to devise a national strategy, based not on "eleventh-hour responses to Soviet-created crises", but on a comprehensive set of long-term policies designed to increase the strength of the free world.

In this speech the Senator listed twelve points within his new approach to foreign policy. These points mark well the prelude to the requirements of the New Frontier strategy (and for this reason they are quoted more extensively in Appendix B). They include:

(1) "We must make invulnerable a nuclear retaliatory power second to none."

(2) "We must retain the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world. ...Mobility and versatility are key needs."

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[9]Senator John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), Preface, no page number.

(3) "We must rebuild NATO into a viable and consolidated military force, capable of deterring any kind of attack, unified in weaponry and responsibility."

(4) "We must, in collaboration with Western Europe and Japan, greatly increase the flow of capital to the Middle East and Latin America....The next President will have to devise an entirely revamped foreign aid program - a program which will make the long-term commitments essential to successful planning...."

(5) "We must reconstruct our relations with the Latin American democracies....We will need a whole new set of attitudes and emphases to make the nations of Latin America full partners in the rapid development of the Western Hemisphere. ..."

(6) "We must work to build the stronger America on which our ultimate ability to defend the free world depends."[10]

This agenda was brought before the public, in a less sophisticated form, during the 1960 Nixon/Kennedy debates. These debates seem to set the tone of national security policy as conceived by Kennedy, that is, they express the attitude that Kennedy had toward U.S. strategy prior to the Presidency. Key Kennedy phrases of the debate were, "deterioration of U.S.

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[10] Ibid.

strength," "U.S. superiority," "determination," "not doing enough," "loss of prestige":

Deterioration of U.S. strength.

> The question is: are we moving in the direction of peace or security? Is our relative strength growing? Is, as Mr. Nixon says, our prestige at an all-time high, as he said a week ago, and that of the Communists at an all-time low? I don't believe it is. I don't believe our relative strength is increasing.[11]

U.S. Superiority.

> The point of all this is, this is a struggle in which we're engaged. We want peace. We want freedom. We want security...I think we have to demonstrate to the people of the world that we're determined in this free country of ours to be first - not first if, and not first but, and not first when - but first.[12]

Loss of prestige.

> And the significance of prestige really, is because we're so identified with the cause of freedom. Therefore, if we're on the mount, if we're using, if our influence is spreading, if our prestige is spreading, then those who stand now on the razor edge of decision between us or between the Communist system, wondering whether they should use the system of freedom to develop their countries or the system of Communism, they'll be persuaded to follow our example.[13]

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[11] Ibid., p. 415.

[12] Ibid., p. 416.

[13] Ibid., p. 408.

The overall implication of these statements is that the Eisenhower administration was inadequate in its approach to national security, that it did not recognize the exigencies of the times. However, that these statements were political accounts for exaggerations and overstatements regarding the state of the nation. At the same time, the attitude prevailing within the minds of the New Frontier seems to be clearly delineated in the "Great Debates." Kennedy felt that the nation needed to be awakened to the revolutionary changes of the times and to the position of the United States within and with relation to these changes.

II. THE ESSENTIALS OF THE KENNEDY NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY STRATEGY

From the above, a most significant factor in this study becomes evident -- there was a decided shift in national strategy during the administration. Rather than elucidate a total strategy at this point, it is more meaningful to note ideas which members of the administration were very probably using to develop strategy in the initial stages of the Kennedy period. For in fact the strategy, as well as the shift, should become quite apparent in later chapters. Such ideas might take the form of the following:

(1) Whatever the strategy, the American people must become aware of the status of our defense program; they must

have some feeling of participation. The strategy hopefully could convey this feeling.

(2) Whatever the strategy, it must have flexibility. A complete spectrum of action must be built into it.

(3) Whatever the strategy, it must enable the President to deal with the enemy on a sophisticated, yet basic, plane; i.e., the President must be able to play the game of diplomacy.

(4) Whatever the strategy, it must be coordinated at all levels (command and control).

(5) Whatever the strategy, it must have credibility.

No doubt there were many other considerations for the authors of the strategy. But certainly the above essentials played a major part in the gradual development of the flexible response strategy. Actual statements encompassing these essentials -- from which the requirements were conceived -- will be seen in chapters IV - VI.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

In this chapter the military requirements and their complementary military postulates are considered. These are discussed as a total package of requirements over the three-year span of the Kennedy administration with little distinction between various stages of the entire period.

I. THREE MAJOR THEMES

The new strategy had three components, as conceived under the strictly military requirements:[1] (1) deterrence of aggression; (2) selectivity; and (3) controlled use of force. Each component, in turn, demanded specific force requirements.

Deterrent

At the highest level of responses is the strategic nuclear deterrent. The Kennedy/McNamara/Rusk doctrine did not envision relaxation of preparation for nuclear warfare; on the contrary, the strategy of conflict called for "application of potential force," and for "a nuclear retaliatory power second to none."

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[1]For a listing of the military requirements of a defense program in the purely military sense and terminology, see Appendix C.

The Kennedy doctrine was in a way an updated, expanded doctrine of massive retaliation. A strategic nuclear force was required to deter nuclear attack upon the Free World. In his State of the Union message of 29 January 1961, the President indicated that he had directed a step-up of both the Polaris submarine program and our entire missile program.[2] More specifically, a deterrent force with second-strike capabilities, i.e., hardened and dispersed, was required.

One of the more eloquent New Frontiersmen, Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Systems Analysis, in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), has decisively defined the requirements of the highest level of the spectrum of forces. His words, in 1963, express perfectly the New Frontier conception of deterrence. Mr. Enthoven wrote: "...[the doctrine requires] secure forces and secure command and control. It requires weapon systems like Minuteman and Polaris that are hard and dispersed; or mobile and concealed, and that can ride out a thermonuclear attack and be held in reserve in the environment of nuclear war. This is one of the reasons why the Department of Defense's

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[2]John F. Kennedy, "State of the Union Message, January 29, 1961," To Turn the Tide, John W. Gardner, (ed.), (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 26.

procurement in the last two years has emphasized Minuteman and Polaris."[3]

Selectivity

A more distinctive change in strategy was the conception of an all-encompassing strategy which left the President with choices of "neither holocaust nor humiliation." The emphasis moved toward balanced forces in lieu of pure counterforce. This strategy and its general "flexible response" requirements were sketched by General Taylor in his speech to the New York Printer's Association on 15 January 1962. He outlined our deterrent requirements:

(a) Total war (either a first strike Russian thermonuclear attack or a massive conventional Russian thrust in Europe) is deterred by invulnerable second strike deterrent forces configured for retaliatory counterforce.

(b) Limited war (Korea) is deterred by adequate available mobile forces equipped with both nuclear and conventional weapons.

(c) "Wars of liberation" (Vietnam and Cuba) are deterred by proper prognosis before the situation goes critical

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[3]Alain C. Enthoven, "U.S. Defense Policy for the 1960's" American Defense Policy, Associates in Political Science, USAF Academy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 314.

and, if deterrence is unsuccessful, are fought by "special and unconventional forces."

(d) Political-economic challenge is countered by imaginative and "good policies", such as the Peace Corps, civic action, interdependence, the Trade Expansion Act, and Project Apollo.[4]

Three days after this speech the President apparently ratified this strategy in an expanded National Security Council gathered at the White House.

This four-part strategy was developed early in the Kennedy administration. The necessity of a wide spectrum of responses was never more evident, for example, than after the Bay of Pigs, the most painful incident in the administration's first year. Three days after this event President Kennedy addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors. It was a solemn, serious speech, which dealt with the problem of the nature of our struggle with the Communist offensive. The message was clear -- new tools, and new concepts had to be developed to deal with the enemy:

> No greater task faces this nation or this Administration. No other challenge is more deserving of our effort and energy. Too

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[4]George E. Lowe, "Neither Humiliation Nor Holocaust," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol 89, Number 6, June 1963, p. 59.

> long have we fixed our eyes on traditional military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders or missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough, that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.[5]

This general requirement of selectivity was expressed succinctly by Secretary McNamara in a symposium on the "Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy" on 15 October 1962:

> In summary, then, we are strengthening our military forces to deal effectively, to deal flexibly, with a wide range of threats, both political and military, and we are working with our allies to develop policies appropriate to the changing needs of the alliance. In our defense policy, as in our foreign policy generally, our effort is to carry out the President's expressed intention to find a third choice between holocaust and humiliation.[6]

Selectivity and flexibility survived the test of time. As will be seen in Chapter IV they were a major part of the message which the President conveyed in his Budget Message to Congress for Fiscal Year 1963.

Many of these key elements were to be found in the Eisenhower administration; however, there is little question

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[5]John F. Kennedy, "Address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1961," To Turn the Tide, p. 47.

[6]"Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1216, pub. 7435, October 1962, p. 559.

[illegible]

that the Kennedy concept placed more stress on the requirement of balanced forces, and on flexibility and mobility. Secretary McNamara has ever gone so far as to state that if a description were to be made of the doctrine, one could say that there was "main but not sole reliance" on conventional forces.

Perhaps the idea of complementarity, as phrased by Mr. Enthoven, is a more accurate description of this conception of selectivity, (more so than "main but not sole" that is):

> But if nuclear forces are not an effective substitute for adequate conventional forces neither are conventional forces an effective substitute for adequate nuclear forces. Rather, the relationship between the two is one of complementarity. Now that the Communistic bloc is armed with nuclear weapons, we cannot successfully fight conventional wars except under the umbrella of nuclear strength.[7]

Controlled use of force

The third theme of the Kennedy doctrine is controlled use of force. This requirement is beautifully stipulated by Mr. Enthoven. He writes that "across the spectrum of conflict, military force is to be used with deliberation and control." There is, he continues, a danger of breakdown of control in the environment of thermonuclear war. But, short of complete destruction of Western society, "there is no point at which it

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[7] Enthoven, op. cit., p. 313.

makes sense to choose to abandon control." Even when it comes to thermonuclear weapons, if our weapons are to be used to keep us alive and free, their use must be controlled.[8]

This concept meant emphasis on the requirement of command and control facilities. It also meant a reevaluation and replanning in Western alliance strategy. Specifically, the Kennedy/McNamara emphasis on controlled deterrents and graduated deterrence had several implications for the NATO strategists:

(a) U.S. hostility toward national nuclear forces. This position was made clear by Secretary McNamara in his famous Ann Arbor speech of 16 June 1962:[9]

> The general strategy I have summarized magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies....We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible. If, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled.[10] (Own underlining)

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[8] Ibid., p. 314

[9] The full text is found in Appendix D.

[10] Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, "Remarks at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, 16 June 1962."

(b) Tactical nuclear weapons. McNamara continued, and continues, to stress that tactical nuclear weapons run the risk of escalation and are no substitute for conventional forces.[11]

(c) Conventional defense. The Kennedy strategy determined greater conventional force requirements in Europe. The shield/sword strategy was quickly passe. And, by November 1963 the strategic landscape in Europe had changed. McNamara could say: "The ground forces of NATO nations total 3.2 million, of which 2.2 million men are in Europe, as against the Soviet ground combat forces total of about 2 million men, and a Warsaw Pact total of 3 million . . . In Central Europe, NATO has more men, and more combat troops, on the ground, than does the Bloc."[12]

In this same speech of November 1963, after having shown the strength of the NATO ground forces, McNamara exhibited the characteristically ambiguous, and subtle nature of his strategy: "None of this is to say that NATO strength on the ground in Europe is adequate to turn back without nuclear weapons an all-out surprise nonnuclear attack."[13]

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[11]Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," American Defense Policy, Associates in Political Science (ed.), p. 366.

[12]Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, "Remarks Before The Economic Club of New York, 18 November 1963," p. 15.

[13]Ibid., p. 17.

These three themes, deterrence-selectivity-control, are basic to the Kennedy strategic conceptual framework for national security policy. They are requirements as well as determinants of military requirements. They are manifested in the budget amendments of Fiscal Year 62 and the decisions of the first hundred days of the New Frontier (and in the remainder of the administration) as will be seen momentarily.

II. COMPLEMENTARY MILITARY POSTULATES

Complementary to these themes are the postulates or assumptions which are bedding for the doctrine of flexible response. This bedding is implicit in the doctrine, but rarely stated as actual requirements. One might label these postulates "conceptual complementary requirements" of the forces-in-being of our national security policy. They are: limited military objectives, will/credibility, superiority, and interdependence of the Western culture.

Limited military objectives

This concept is best understood in connection with the nonmilitary requirement of primacy of the political. Suffice it to say that conditions of the international system have greatly altered the concept of total warfare.

Presidential and national will/credibility

President Kennedy and his advisors recognized from

the beginning the absolute necessity of strong, forceful and determined will in the strategy of conflict. The enemy must without a doubt recognize that the U.S. is firm in her policy.

The President's memorable Inaugural Address forcefully established this concept as a requirement of our security policy: "Let every nation know that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."[14]

Thus, the equation of power equals strength times will (P=SW) was recognized; the intimate relationship of capability and intention was recognized. The enemy must have no question as to our intents and purposes. Discussing national security and peaceful coexistence in February 1962, Mr. Theodore C. Achilles, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, expressed this strong conviction of the New Frontier:

> But one decisive point must be made. Soviet concern over the consequences of a nuclear war is, and will continue to be, directly proportional to our

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[14]John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961, To Turn the Tide, p. 7.

> capability and our will to produce the consequences that they fear.[15]

Mr. Achilles went on to say that any relaxation -- "any demonstration of uncertainty of will on our part" -- and the Soviets could come to a different estimation of the likely outcome of one or another gamble.

A basic conceptual requirement of national security in the New Frontier and one which is related directly to the idea of will is that the enemy be convinced that we will use our spectrum of capabilities. Say the New Frontiersmen, "The important thing is not to convince an aggressor that we will use nuclear weapons. The important thing is to convince him that we will use whatever force that is necessary to preserve our freedom . . . the most credible kind of threat is the threat that we will do what in the event will be most in our interest to do. In the case of piecemeal nonnuclear aggression, that will be to apply conventional forces."[16] Credibility, then, is a fundamental requirement.

Strength without will accomplishes nothing, just as will without strength can accomplish little. In reading personal accounts of President Kennedy's approach to foreign policy,

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[15]Theodore C. Achilles, "Peaceful Coexistence and U.S. National Security," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLVI, No. 1183, Pub. 7343, 26 February 1962, p. 326.

[16]Enthoven, op. cit., p. 312.

one senses that he was deeply concerned with the need to be determined and willful, and to communicate this determination to the enemy. Hugh Sidey, a White House correspondent for Time during the first two years of the New Frontier, writes of a private Kennedy comment: "The State Department is a bowl of jelly . . . it's got all those people over there who are constantly smiling. I think we need to smile less and be tougher."[17]

(The Kennedy decision to shift Chester Bowles from Under Secretary to Special Representative and Adviser to the President can be rationalized in light of this comment.)

In the first several months of office, President Kennedy again and again stressed the need for the nation to move forward in a determined, certain course of action. His Inaugural, State of the Union, and Special Messages to Congress all have the flavor of this concept. He seemed to be attempting to guide the nation into a mental framework for the doctrine of flexible response. The psychological barriers he was attempting to knock over can best be illustrated by briefly considering the lower level of the spectrum of responses, generally speaking, the level of limited warfare.

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[17]Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy, President, A Reporter's Inside Story (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 214.

As one military writer, Captain Harvey S. Deis, U.S. Navy, aptly asked in March 1961, "Are We Ready to Wage Limited War?"[18] As the doctrine of flexible response evolved in the minds of the military and policy-makers from 1955 on, was the public attitude evolving correspondingly? Public attitude was the force that President Kennedy was trying to move; he was determined to awaken the nation to a proper perspective for the 60's.

Thus, the challenge for the New Frontier was to make the public aware of the equation R=CW, or, readiness equals capability times willingness; in other words, the New Frontier, having determined will power to be a vital requirement of national security, set out to convince the American public of this requirement. One excellent example of an attempt to awaken the public's eyes was the President's decision on the Berlin recall in the summer of 1961. Hugh Sidey writes:

> In his private moments the President worried about the state of preparedness of the country. Were the people ready for a showdown? . . . And appeals over TV, stories in the magazines and news conferences were not enough. <u>There had to be some sense of participation</u>.[19] (own underlining)

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[18]Captain Harvey S. Deis, U.S. Navy, "Are We Ready to Wage Limited War?" (Prize Essay, 1961), <u>United States Naval Institute Proceedings</u>, Vol. 87, No. 3, p. 29.

[19]Sidey, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 210.

Superiority

A consistent postulate of the New Frontier is the requirement of nuclear superiority (both tactical and strategic) to the enemy. The administration has merely adopted a postulate implicit in our security program since post-World War Two. The very first point on Senator Kennedy's "12 point agenda" of June 1960 assumed this concept: "First - we must make invulnerable a nuclear retaliatory power second to none."

In a discussion of November 1963 of the field of tactical nuclear weapons, Secretary McNamara assumed superiority. He stated that there is a consensus that the U.S. is presently substantially superior in design, diversity and numbers in this class of weapons. McNamara called this an indispensable superiority, "as we can readily understand if we consider how our problems of strategic choice would be altered if the tables were reversed and it were the Soviet Union which held a commanding lead in this field."[20]

President Kennedy summed up this concept in his Inaugural Address: "We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed."[21]

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[20]Robert S. McNamara, op. cit., p. 11. (Economics Club Address)

[21]John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1961, To Turn The Tide, p. 8.

Interdependence of Western Culture

Another postulate of the Kennedy strategy was the necessity of Western alliance and unity. This again was not a new assumption, yet the Kennedy conception of Western relationships was unique. The President realized the changing nature of the members of the alliance. He realized that European dependence upon the United States would not be a permanent relationship. The U.S. goal stemming from these facts was to be a partnership.

This concept was fully developed in President Kennedy's celebrated July 4th (1962) address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:

> But I will say here and now on this day of independence that the United States will be ready for a "Declaration of interdependence," that we will be prepared to discuss . . . with a United Europe the way and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American union founded here 175 years ago.[22]

As we know, the President's "Grand Design" did not come into being in the following years. Yet President Kennedy had sensed the problems inherent in building a partnership. In

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[22]John F. Kennedy, "The Goal of An Atlantic Partnership, Department of State Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1204, Pub 7412, p. 132.

his July 4th speech he concluded, "All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is our goal."[23]

W. W. Rostow, Chairman of the Department of State's Policy Planning Council, and a prominent member of the New Frontier, marks the building of the Atlantic partnership as "the most complex and delicate piece of international architecture ever undertaken at a time of peace."[24] As we realize, in view of present NATO internal problems, construction of this edifice is very delicate and very complex.

Many of the architectural problems originate from the requirements of controlled use of force and flexible response. The first theme is hostile to national nuclear forces, demanding unity and central control; the second calls for a larger spectrum of forces and therefore a build-up in the European conventional forces. The friction created by these themes of the Kennedy/McNamara strategy in Europe is self-evident; in 1967 the Johnson/McNamara team is battling with this same friction.

Such friction is best understood by hearing our spokesmen on the other side of the Atlantic. Lieutenant Colonel P. E. Beneste, of the French Army, exemplifies the French position,

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[23] Ibid., p. 133.

[24] W. W. Rostow, View From the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 60.

the one which is most divergent from the doctrine of flexible response. In an article written in October 1964, "U.S. 'Strategies' and Continental Europe," Lt. Col. Beneste argues in favor of a U.S. Counterforce (in the sense of shoot the military) strategy within NATO. He argues in favor of the tactical use of nuclear weapons in NATO . . . "the devil of escalation must be exorcised." We must checkmate the last possible Soviet indirect approach to the Western Alliance -- the Red Army along the Iron Curtain. The vehemence of the argument is evident: its opposition to U.S. strategy, apparent:

> It must be understood, once and for all, that no true Atlantic partnership, no surrender of "nationalism" will ever happen as long as the leader sets the contrary example, and sticks to such obviously nationalistic dinosaurs as the useless and obsolete MacMahon Act.[25]

As long as the threat of the Red Army remains, continues Lt. Col. Geneste, the Continental Europeans must possess (with or without help from the U.S.) the means of deterring by themselves "the Red rocket blackmail." (This refers to Countercity strategy.) The Frenchman concludes, "God helps him who helps himself."[26] And, as we have seen in the

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[25]Lt. Col. M. S. Geneste, French Army, "U.S. 'Strategies' and Continental Europe," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 90, Number 10, October, 1964, p. 39.

[26]Ibid., p. 40.

ensuing years, DeGaulle helped himself.

In concluding, one could state that there was a definite general trend extant in the New Frontier conception of military requirements. This was the trend toward balanced forces, away from a Utopian counterforce strategy. The groundwork was laid by the Eisenhower administration; however, it only gave lip service to the concept of limited war, with little support through budgetary action.

Mr. George E. Lowe, a Foreign Service officer, writing in the Naval Institute Proceedings of April 1962, appropriately summarizes this trend:

> Of all the actions concerned with national security that the Kennedy Administration has taken thus far, three stand out: the stress on invulnerable second strike deterrent forces; the greater emphasis on limited war and paramilitary operations, and the appointment of one of the major formulators of flexible response or balanced deterrence, General Maxwell D. Taylor, as the President's military advisor.[27]

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[27]George E. Lowe, "Balanced Forces or Counterforce?," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 88, Number 4, April 1962, p. 26.

CHAPTER IV

THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS

The less-clearly conceived nonmilitary requirements are more difficult to analyze and evaluate. Yet, the New Frontier, with eloquence of phrase as one of its attributes, conceived certain nonmilitary requirements of national security policy to be pre-eminent. These requirements might be listed as U.S. economic strength, positive U.S. action and leadership, political interdependence within the Atlantic Alliance, executive style or technique, and primacy of the political.

I. U.S. ECONOMIC STRENGTH

There is little doubt that the New Frontier recognized the prosperity of the United States to be an irreducible minimum requirement of a national security policy. President Kennedy was convinced that the key to the successful administration was more stability in the national economy. Further, he knew that strength at home was vital to strength abroad.

II. POSITIVE U.S. ACTION AND LEADERSHIP

From its beginning, from the time "the torch was passed,"

the New Frontier emphasized that the U.S. was to assume a new role in the Cold War and in the international system in toto. This requirement can perhaps best be understood conceptually by grasping the view of Dr. Charles O. Lerche. In The Cold War . . . And After, Dr. Lerche discusses U.S. cold war strategy in terms of two stages. The purpose of the first stage of our (U.S.) "strategy of response" was basically that of containment; the purpose of the second was "to commit Moscow to the acceptance of a rational and institutionalized international political system."[1] This second stage was not effectively implemented until the Kennedy administration, says Dr. Lerche: "It was the fate of the tragically brief Kennedy administration to make the first overt if hesitant moves toward its implementation. 'Response' in second-stage American strategy would no longer be a useful basis for action." Once American strategy was advanced to this stage, writes Dr. Lerche, "tactical initiatives must be the keystone of United States policy."[2]

One senses this shift into a second stage in reading the literature of the New Frontier. The need to act, to move, is highly emphasized, in fact too much so, say critics of the

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[1]Charles O. Lerche, The Cold War . . . And After (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 60.

[2]Ibid., p. 62.

New Frontier. Closely tied in with this action policy is recognition of the revolutionary changes presently occurring within the international system. Secretary Rusk, speaking in May 1962, states: "The President thus calls upon us to resume our leadership in the revolution of freedom and to join with it our leadership in the revolution of economic and social progress . . . It is a task of uniting the nations into one great family of man."[3]

Earlier in the administration Rusk stated this same requirement in a different context. He alluded to the great changes in the world today, stating that our foreign policy could be formulated through two different approaches. On the one hand, we could undertake active defense of the status quo and be passive in relation to these changes. On the other hand, we can "attempt to take a certain leadership in change itself; certainly the world is not as we should like to see it, and the world is not as peoples elsewhere find tolerable."[4]

Needless to say, the latter approach was adopted by the Kennedy administration. The requirement of "leadership in change" was a strong conviction of President Kennedy . . .

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[3]Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, The Winds of Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), "Remarks at the University of Tennessee, 17 May 1962," p. 47.

[4]Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, "A Fresh Look at the Formulation of Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin, XLIX, No. 1134, 20 March 1961, p. 396.

"We seek, in short, not a static but a dynamic peace," declared his Secretary of State.[5] This conception of leadership subtlely underlies the statements of the New Frontiersmen. The policies of military containment and of negative "anti-communism" are passe and gone forever.

Theodore Achilles boldly states this requirement: "It is not enough merely to be against something or to react. We must act; we must be positive and dynamic. We must get on with the job of helping to shape the kind of world we would want to see if Marxist-Leninism had never existed."[6] Clearly then, second stage policy is to be implemented. And clearly the fourth requirement of General Taylor's four-part spectrum is to be activated.

Central to this conception of U.S. strategy is the belief that the U.S. must play a vital role in relation to the underdeveloped countries. We must not permit the image of a status quo nation, thwarting the forces of change, to prevail throughout these countries. We must emphasize our belief in change, to the point of overstatement. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Carl Bowen, writes, "The status quo has never been our god; so let it

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[5]Dean Rusk, "Building the Frontiers of Freedom," Department of State Bulletin, XVIV, No. 1147, 19 June 1961.

[6]Achilles, op. cit., p. 327.

be clear that we ask no other people to worship it."[7]

This "leadership in change" requirement was basic to the less urgent, but just as dangerous, crises that the Kennedy administration faced in January 1961. W. W. Rostow, speaking almost two years later, gave a terse evaluation of the policy requirements the New Frontier envisioned in order to meet the Communist offensive:

(a) We needed, for example, a policy which would align the United States actively with the great forces in Latin America which seek economic development and greater social justice. (Alliance for Progress.)

(b) We needed a foreign aid program capable of aligning the United States with similar forces at work in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa (AID and new foreign aid legislation).

(c) We needed development of new relationships with Western Europe, for the "facts of life" had changed in Western Europe.[8]

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[7]Carl Rowan, "The U.S. and Revolution," Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, No. 1144, 29 May 1961, p. 797.

[8]W. W. Rostow, "The Present Stage of the Cold War," Department of State Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1219, Pub 7444, October 1962, p. 675.

III. NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH WESTERN PARTNERS

This last required policy leads into another non-military requirement as conceived by the New Frontier; that is, a new relationship with our Western partners. Just as this was a military requirement, so too it was a requirement from a political and economic standpoint. It is appropriate here to repeat the President's July 4th 1962 words, ". . . we will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence."

Policy statements by Undersecretary of State (for Political Affairs) George McGhee, in defense of the President's trade program, bring forward this requirement. The trade program, stated McGhee, provides the keystone to our whole forward national strategy:

> The adoption of the proposed trade legislation will permit the United States to cooperate in building a solid economic foundation underneath the Atlantic community system, which the "grand design" envisages as the hard core of the security and economic well-being of the entire Free World.[9]

McGhee concluded his defense by reiterating the requirement of unity among free nations, unity through development of a real community of interests, involving <u>all</u> the varied activities and aspirations of man. This statement

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[9]George McGhee, "The President's Trade Program - Key to the Grand Design," <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, XLVI, No. 1182, Pub 7340, 19 February 1962, p. 292.

illustrates the requirement of U.S. relationship with other highly industrialized countries in the Free World in more than the military sense. We know that interdependence is the condition of the times.

IV. EXECUTIVE TECHNIQUE

A further requirement of national security policy as conceived by the Kennedy administration is what is nebulously termed executive style. President Kennedy, an intellectual's executive and an historian in his own right, felt quite strongly about this requirement and its corollaries, all distinctly related to policy-making and its machinery. Mr. William Carey, Executive Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget, after having discussed the changes of policy-making under Kennedy, concluded with a contrast of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations: "And yet if I were to sum up the contrast in the styles of the two administrations, I would say that in the Kennedy approach to policymaking we observe an emphasis on technique as opposed to an obsession with structure, together with a strong inclination to focus responsibility in individual ideals as against groups."[10]

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[10]William D. Carey, "Decision Making: Coordinating Policies and Programs," U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Selected Papers, 87th Congress, 2d Session, p. 58.

Mr. Carey is an admirer of the Kennedy "style." There are others who are more reluctant to praise the Kennedy approach. The style appears to them to be informal and casual. It is too elaborate, they say, with its obsession for quantitative methodology and empirical inquiry and its tendency to require decision-making to be directed to the top. Furthermore, critics write, there is no priority of urgency in the Kennedy policy-making process.[11]

Whatever the valid evaluation, in April 1961 President Kennedy realized that the national security policy machinery needed oiling and tightening up in light of the Bay of Pigs tragedy. He asked General Taylor, just then settling in New York as president of the Lincoln Arts Center for the Performing Arts, to head an investigation of the disaster. Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and Allen Dulles helped Taylor. The result was manifestation of machinery which better suited the Kennedy style.

This was the style that won John F. Kennedy the Presidential election. Mr. Sidey writes of the New Frontiersmen: "They questioned every premise. They accepted no man's word, they had to see things for themselves. They were realists.

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[11]Charles Burton Marshall, "Making Foreign Policy on the New Frontier," U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Selected Papers, 87th Congress, 2d Session, p. 179.

They wanted facts, not judgments. They made the judgment when they got the facts. They introduced into American politics an element of scientific procedure that changed it dramatically."[12]

There was realism. There was recognition of the exigencies of the time, as expressed in the Inaugural; but beneath it there was confidence in the President, in the New Frontier, and in the United States.

V. PRIMACY OF THE POLITICAL

A most significant requirement of national security policy is the primacy of the political. Policies of the Kennedy administration have very definitely established this requirement. Henry Kissinger, in writing of strategies, clearly realizes this Kennedy concept:

> One of the most important efforts of the Kennedy administration has been to subject military strategy -- and particularly nuclear weapons -- to political control not only before hostilities but during military operations as well. The previous notion had been that if deterrence failed there was no logical stopping place.[13]

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[12]Sidey, op. cit., p. 148.

[13]Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," American Defense Policy, Associates in Political Science, USAF Academy, p. 367.

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Recognition of this concept is at the heart of acceptance of the strategy of limited war. Robert E. Osgood's writings on limited war in the late 50's relate the American position as it has been and as it should and must be. His writings are indeed examples of the concept of political primacy as conceived by the Kennedy administration. Dr. Osgood justifies limited war on the grounds that military power should be subordinate to national policy, and that the only legitimate purpose of military force is to serve the nation's political objectives.[14]

As Kissinger stated, the Kennedy administration made a vast effort to establish the principle of political over and above military as a requirement of national security policy.

This Kennedy concept is not a novel idea; rather, it is one that has evolved with the passage of time and the growing up of the United States as a superpower. The role of the military in the U.S. has had to shift with the changing nature of power within the international system. Sound policy in the 1960's had to be based upon a broad spectrum of factors, all of which are intermeshed. The military factors cannot and must not predominate. However, they must be properly weighed and never forgotten or downgraded.

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[14]Robert E. Osgood, "The American Approach to War," American Defense Policy, pp. 98-109.

Advancing one step further, one can state that at the base of the shift of strategy from massive retaliation to balanced forces is the fact that the politically usable forms of power have changed. This fact, which has been highly developed by Captain Carl [illegible]. Amme, Jr., U.S. Navy (Ret.), is, in effect, at the crux of the Kennedy requirement of political primacy.

The effect of political, technological and international changes on military power is phenomenal, says Captain Amme. War has become less useful as an instrument of policy; military power and politics have become even more inseparable; a role for the military power of the U.S. or U.S.S.R. in insurgency movements and in measures to counter them becomes prominent; military power as a technique of action moves further down the spectrum and unambiguous limits of purpose, means and territory will be established.[15]

In his Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget, 28 March 1961, President Kennedy strongly emphasized the political/military power relationship:

> . . . The basic problems facing the world today are not susceptible to a military solution. Our military posture must be sufficiently

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[15]Captain C. H. Amme, Jr., U.S.N. (Ret.), "The Changing Nature of Power," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol 89, Number 3, March 1963, pp. 28-30.

> flexible and under control to be consistent with our efforts to explore all possibilities and to take every step to lessen tensions, to obtain peaceful solutions and to secure arms limitations. Diplomacy and defense are no longer distinct alternatives, one to be used where the other fails; each must complement the other.[16]

In this same message the President mentioned a corollary requirement of political primacy; to wit: our arms must be subject to ultimate civilian control and command at all times. A study of the strengthening of the Secretary of Defense's position, relative to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs, under the Kennedy administration, would undoubtedly indicate that this corollary requirement has been strictly adhered to by the Department of Defense. The legislation was present under the Eisenhower administration for a powerful civilian head in the Department of Defense, particularly after 1958. However, other than in the very basic sense of civilian control this legislation was not fully used.

The above is a short introduction to the complexity of the political/military power relationship and to the changes that have occurred therein since 1945. These changes are fundamental to an understanding of the Kennedy conception of political primacy and its complementary strategic conceptions.

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[16]John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget, March 28, 1961," To Turn the Tide, p. 55.

The space decision (Project Apollo) in 1961 is an excellent illustration of the primacy of the political. Reporter Hugh Sidey writes of the meetings of the President and his space advisors shortly after Yuri Gagarin's flight. The President had been busy in the early weeks of the New Frontier with the day-to-day problems and hadn't taken too much time to consider the space race. At the close of one of the meetings, Kennedy uttered his feelings about the decision:

> When we know more, I can decide if it's worth it or not. If somebody can just tell me how to catch up. Let's find somebody -- anybody. I don't care if it's the janitor over there, if he knows how . . . There's nothing more important.[17]

Six weeks later, 25 May 1961, the President stood before Congress for a second time in four months of holding office. His message possessed the familiar ring of a sense of urgency, yet it was determined and confident in tenor:

> I believe we possess all the resources and talents necessary . . . I am asking the Congress and the country to accept a firm commitment to a new course of action, a course which will last for many years and carry very heavy costs . . . I believe we should go to the moon.[18]

The space decision can only be comprehended in light of the

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[17]Sidey, op. cit., pp. 122-23.

[18]John F. Kennedy, "Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs," To Turn the Tide, pp. 73-76.

New Frontier's conception of the nature of power and of the unprecedented struggle for prestige and influence presently rampant in the international system. Once this is realized, many other New Frontier programs are appreciated.

CHAPTER V

BUILDING THE STRATEGY - 1961

I. THOSE FIRST FEW MONTHS

Implementation of the requirements is best observed through historical documentation. Therefore, the next three chapters describe various ways and means by which the conceptual requirements became reality.

The 1961 chapter first discusses the first months of the administration, some basic strategic trends during the year and, finally, the two major crises of 1961, the Bay of Pigs and Berlin.

The initial official announcement of new strategic guidelines came in the President's State of the Union message, 29 January, 1961. The President stated that "we must re-examine and revise our whole arsenal of tools: military, economic and political."[1] Hence, the concept of a multifaceted security policy was apparent.

In the military "arsenal of tools," the new strategy was most evident. President Kennedy spoke of three new steps that were "clearly needed now":

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[1]John F. Kennedy, "State of the Union Message, January 29, 1961," To Turn the Tide, p. 24.

(1) Prompt action to increase the airlift capacity to give conventional forces the mobility needed to deal with small war situations.

(2) Acceleration of the Polaris program.

(3) Prompt action to accelerate our entire missile program.[2]

One sees the doctrine of flexible response evolving; i.e., mobility, ability to fight limited wars, and invulnerable deterrent. Three days later, Secretary McNamara discussed several defense measures. He announced plans to increase troop/cargo airlift capacity. First deliveries of C-135's and C-130E's were scheduled for mid-61, four years ahead of previous plans for introduction of pure jets into air lift inventory. The Polaris program was to be accelerated by nine to ten months through the use of unobligated funds.

Reappraisal of our defense program, which the President directed in his State of the Union message, resulted in amendment of the defense budget estimates for 1962 three times. The first request of 28 March 1961 was designed:

(1) To accelerate the shift in emphasis in our strategic forces to weapon systems which could ride out an all-out nuclear attack;

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[2]Ibid., p. 25-26.

(2) to improve the command and control system so that our military forces would at all times, even under conditions of an all-out nuclear attack, be under the full control of constituted authorities, and;

(3) to improve and modernize our conventional or nonnuclear capabilities.

The second request of 26 May 1961 was designed "to improve and modernize further the conventional or nonnuclear capabilities" and to accelerate work in outer space. The purpose of the third supplemental request of 26 July was (1) to increase substantially the strength and readiness of our conventional or nonnuclear capabilities, (2) to prepare for further mobilization of reserve forces if the need should become apparent, and (3) to increase further our strategic and air defense capabilities.[3]

These were all granted by the Congress and enacted into law on 17 August 1961. The defense appropriation for fiscal year 1962 was six and one-half billion dollars more than the year before. A change of strategy was not inexpensive.

The State of the Union message and the FY 62 budget requests provide definitive indorsement of the new strategic

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[3]Captain C. H. Amme, U.S.N., "Naval Strategy and the New Frontier," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 88, Number 3, March 1962, pp. 23-24.

policy of flexible response as had been conceived by General Taylor in the fifties. Of the direction of the New Frontier in those first months much has been written; there are many intangibles, difficult to pinpoint. They fall within what has here been delineated as "non-military requirements," and have in the main been discussed in that chapter. Suggestion of these intangibles is sufficient: willingness to make hard choices: public relations discipline; new position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the quantitative/systems analysis approach; cost-effectiveness; political primacy; anti-formalism; and renewal of cultural atmosphere in the White House.

II. GENERAL STRATEGIC TRENDS

It would be less than realistic to profess that the Kennedy strategic requirements were clear after those first few months, or even by the end of the year. Secretary McNamara frankly admitted to Congress in April that requirements at the strategic level were inadequate. Responding to a question as to whether we have an adequate idea of how much we need to survive an attack, and, to retaliate effectively, Mr. McNamara stated:

> . . . First, I do not believe we have an adequate statement of our requirements at the present time. We are undertaking a development of just exactly that as a

> foundation for the fiscal year 1963 budget proposals.
>
> Secondly, I do not believe we will ever be able to develop such a statement of requirements with such precision as to yield a definite answer which can be presented without qualification.
>
> I say that because there are parts of the equation to which we will never have the final answers.[4]

Realizing the meaning of Mr. McNamara's thoughts, it is remarkable how far the administration had progressed in its strategic thinking during those first few months.

Professor Loy Henderson, American University, reaffirmed the vagueness of Kennedy foreign policy concepts in 1961. In his class notes for Problems of Diplomacy (1965), Dr. Henderson asserts that in the earlier speeches by President Kennedy the statements with respect to foreign policy did not fall into "an orderly framework."

In summarizing U.S. defense policies in the year 1961, Mr. John Norris, military affairs reporter for the Washington Post wrote:

> As the year drew to a close, it was not yet clear just where the Kennedy administration was headed, beyond the clear outline of more secure

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[4]Robert S. McNamara, United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations DOD Appropriations for 1962, Hearings before the Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Part 3 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 137.

> but limited strategic retaliatory and stronger conventional forces already projected. World events undoubtedly would play a large role in shaping future U.S. defense policy.[5]

And indeed world events did materially shape Kennedy defense policies from the Summer of '61 on.

At this point one must conclude, with Professor Henderson, Mr. Norris, and others such as Henry Kissinger that foreign policy objectives in the Kennedy administration, 1961, were not presented in an orderly way that may be regarded as a conceptual framework - which makes for much difficulty in studying the policies!

Notwithstanding this lack of clearcut strategic requirements, as early as the first Kennedy budget amendment in April (mentioned above briefly) one can begin to see some of the basic requirements coming to the forefront. In his session with Congress, Secretary McNamara hits at these highlights. McNamara's statement included the following points:

a. Polaris/Minuteman - second generation solid-fuel programs - are required. These forces can ride out a massive nuclear attack and be applied with deliberation, always under the complete control of the constituted authority.

/Here we have deterrence, command and control requirements./

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[5]John Gilbert Norris, "United States Defense Policies," Encyclopaedia Britannica Yearbook, 1962 (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.), p. 202.

b. Limited war forces are to be emphasized. Having recognized the need for strategic forces, Mr. McNamara stressed the importance of the united war forces:

> . . . But, having provided for these essential forces (strategic), we want to see to it that this nation, in cooperation with its friends and allies abroad, has the kinds of forces needed to discourage more limited military adventures by the enemies of freedom.[6]

c. In this same vein, in the testimony McNamara stated that our limited war forces should be properly deployed, properly trained, and properly equipped to deal with "the entire spectrum" of actions. They should have both the means to move quickly to wherever they may be needed on very short notice, and the ability to respond promptly to limited aggressions.[7]

These ideas of course are assumed parts of the requirements of selectivity and controlled use of force.

d. Mr. McNamara succinctly summed up his basic approach in one sentence: ". . . What is being proposed at this time is not a reversal of our existing national policy, but, an increase in our nonnuclear capabilities to provide a greater degree of versatility to our limited war forces."[8]

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[6] McNamara, op. cit., p. 18.

[7] Ibid. [8] Ibid., p. 19.

Specific recommendations in the amendment for requirements which supported this basic strategic concept included: an increase in procurement of conventional weapons and equipment; improvement of national readiness of the fleet; modification of the F-105; development of a new triservice tactical fighter (TFX); increase in training and readiness exercises; increase in personnel strengths; increase in R & D on nonnuclear weapons and other equipment.

e. In replying to whether U.S. military posture was headed for basic change, McNamara was noncommittal. Yet how he answered this question is significant. First, he discussed the nuclear requirements, and then reiterated that there was a need to strengthen the capacity to engage in wars with conventional weapons;

> . . . We are increasing the inventories and our ability to utilize non-nuclear weapons, hereby raising the level at which we would be required to use nuclear weapons.[9]

In effect, the change was patent -- there had been a reassessment of national security requirements; the administration, as early as April 1961, was gradually shifting to the capability to launch a full spectrum of response, both flexible and varied in nature.

Appendix E shows the full impact of the 1961 budget

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[9]Ibid., p. 143.

amendments, as well as other decreases and increases in monies throughout the administration. The basic requirements were thus laid on very early by the administration though perhaps not in an "orderly," clear-cut fashion. Further explication of them is to be seen in Secretary McNamara's testimony before Congress vis-a-vis the Third FY 1962 Budget amendment, the testimony was a reemphasis, and refinement, of previous statements. As William W. Kaufmann, author of The McNamara Strategy, states, "most of the recommendations [in this third amendment] were directed toward increasing the non-nuclear chips."[10]

III. TWO CRISES IN 1961

The year 1961 will be remembered for at least two key crises - the Bay of Pigs and Berlin. A brief contrast of administration handling of these two "hot spots" provides insight into the development of the administration's strategic requirements, both military and nonmilitary.

Bay of Pigs

There have been multitudinous writings on the events encompassing the Bay of Pigs incident. For present purposes, extensive factual coverage is unnecessary. This unfortunate happening reminds us that national security policy formulation

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[10] William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 67.

is unbelievably complex, and that nonmilitary requirements are a vital part of the decision-making process.

This fiasco pointed up to President Kennedy many of the weaknesses in previous national security policy requirements (particularly nonmilitary). He realized abruptly and painfully that the national security policy organization needed tightening, that inexperience was no excuse for this or subsequent wrong decisions, and that the public would be hard to reconcile.

Berlin

Several months later through actions/policies during the Berlin crisis, the administration exhibited remarkable facility for command and control of a crisis. The immediate, resolute Presidential reaction to Russian moves should be interpreted as manifestation of the flexible response strategy which had been developing for at least six months, as we have seen.

The President's well-known speech on 25 July to Congress truly proclaims most of the requirements discussed in Chapters II and III. President Kennedy stated here that military planning was designed to provide:

> . . . the capability of placing in any critical area at the appropriate time a force which, combined with those of our allies, is large enough to make clear our determination and our ability

> to defend our rights at all costs--
> and to meet all levels of aggressor
> pressure with whatever levels of force
> are required. We intend to have a
> wider choice than humiliation or all-
> out nuclear action.[11]

Having read this, one is reminded of the nonmilitary requirement of determination/will. (P=SW)

Mr. McNamara reinforced these words in his statement before the Congress 26 July. The basic short-term objective of the measures proposed, he said, is to attain a greater range of military options together with the related deterrent and political effects which would go with them:

> . . . The purpose is twofold: to deter
> the Soviets from pressing a Berlin
> crisis to the point of conflict, and
> to become better able to deal with
> any conflict which might nevertheless
> occur.[12]

Specific actions taken to meet the Berlin crisis were: step up of recruiting; tours of duty extended; National Guard and reservists were called to active duty; additional funds were applied to the rapid procurement of tactical arms and equipment.

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[11]John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 535.

[12]Robert S. McNamara, United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations for 1962, Hearings before the Subcommittee, 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), 26 July 1961, Amendment #3 to Budget, p. 1626.

The DOD Annual Report of 1962 aptly defines the meaning of such actions: ". . . The actions taken in August and September 1961 placed beyond doubt the determination of the United States to defend Western rights and this contributed immensely to the maintenance of peace."[13]

In reading of the Berlin actions one quickly realizes that certainly the administration's response to the Soviet challenge was logical, based upon administration pronouncements in previous months. That is, the student of John F. Kennedy would see no recourse for the President at this time but a determined, strong response. To have done otherwise would have repudiated established requirements for the flexible response strategy which had been developing since December 1960.

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[13] DOD Annual Report for FY 62, Including Reports of Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy and Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 4.

CHAPTER VI

YEAR OF CRISIS - 1962

The year 1962 in retrospect proved to be the year of actual testing of the Kennedy security doctrine. Development, as well as confirmation, of the basic requirements continued throughout the year.

I. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION STATEMENTS

The McNamara budget statement was but an extension of the requirements set out in 1961 - but with more confidence and conviction applied. There was the same determinism, the same push for positive policy, ". . . we need not and are not merely reacting to the Communist initiative."[1] There was also the matured conclusion that the nonnuclear forces must be increased. Secretary McNamara stated:

> After long and intensive study, we have reached the conclusion that, while our nuclear forces are necessary, greater emphasis than in the past must be given, both by ourselves and our NATO allies, to our nonnuclear forces. This does not mean that we would hesitate to use nuclear

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[1] Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations for 1963, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, 87th Congress, 2nd session, Part 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 7.

weapons even in a limited war situation if needed.[2]

The policy was clearer than in 1961, but just as ambiguous. McNamara reiterated the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war situation. He reiterated that the budget proposals were not a reversal in existing policy, but rather, an increase in the nonnuclear capability in order to provide a greater degree of versatility to the limited war forces. McNamara also stated, in general terms, the requirements for adequate, limited war capability:

a. Adequate, combat-ready conventional forces;

b. Airlift and sealift to move these forces promptly to wherever they may be needed;

c. Tactical air support for the ground forces;

d. Sea forces to insure control of the seas;

e. Balanced and properly proportioned inventories of weapons, equipment and combat consumables to insure that these forces have what they need to fight effectively, i.e., logistical support.[3]

Regarding limited war capability, Mr. McNamara said that the FY 1963 budget provided three "quite significant" increases:

(1) a 5-division increase to an 11-division combat

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[2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Ibid., p. 9.

force, which is roughly a 45 percent increase in the number of combat-ready divisions;

(2) a substantial increase in the procurement of Army material;

(3) a substantial increase in the number of tactical air wings and the number of combat tactical aircraft.[4]

One of the most sticky programs presented to the Congress in 1962 was the Reserve and Guard Program. Mr. McNamara, in speaking for the administration, spoke quite vehemently and resolutely about realigning this program - reshaping it into a more useful, ready resource. His thoughts personalize the requirement for flexible, available resources for the executive/policy maker. He emphasized two points with respect to the Reserve and National Guard program:

> Regardless of the amount of money, regardless of the drill pay strength, as a Nation we should take the steps to reorganize, or realign as you will, Reserve and Guard forces in order to increase the strength of certain of the units, the so-called priority divisions that are necessary to supplement our Active Forces in support of our contingency war plans. This is an absolute essential military requirement.[5]

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[4]Ibid., p. 101.

[5]Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations for 1963, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, 87th Congress, 2nd session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), 14 Feb 1962, p. 1257.

The second point was that the units associated with activities or equipment no longer necessary should be realigned or eliminated.

Thus McNamara was streamlining the defense forces, shaping them into a more credible limited war weapon.

President Kennedy's annual message to the Congress, 1962, and the Fiscal Year 1963 Budget were indicative that the strategy of flexible response and requirements thereof prevailed. In his message to the Congress, Kennedy stressed that our strength might be tested at many levels, and that at all times the capacity to resist nonnuclear or limited attacks - "as a complement to our nuclear capacity, not as a substitute" - would be there. ". . . We have rejected any all-or-nothing posture which would leave us no choice but inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation."[6]

The Fiscal Year 1963 Budget of the United States Government listed the key elements in our defense program to include: a strategic offensive force which would survive and respond overwhelmingly after a massive nuclear attack; a command and control system which would survive and direct the response; an improved anti-bomber defense system; a civil defense program which would help to protect an important proportion of our

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[6]John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 10.

population from the perils of nuclear fallout; combat ready limited war forces and the air and sealift needed to move them quickly to wherever they might have to be displayed; and special forces to help our allies cope with the threat of Communist-sponsored insurrection and subversion.[7]

II. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

There was Mr. McNamara's famous counterforce speech at Ann Arbor, and there were other significant speeches, all of which fortify the basic strategy as it had developed. But the event which came to pass in October 1962 seems to powerfully surpass all the big words and point toward one direction - a Kennedy determined policy, with the necessary requirements at all levels, had become a proven reality.

The DOD Annual Report, though admittedly biased, aptly sums up the meaning of Cuba:

> The Cuban crisis demonstrated the readiness of our armed forces to meet a sudden emergency. It also highlighted the importance of maintaining a properly balanced Defense establishment, including not only retaliatory forces of overwhelming strength but also adequately trained and equipped units in sufficient numbers for lesser types of action. This military flexibility

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[7] Budget of the United States, FY 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office).

population from the world's no nonsense Christmas reality
listed was Thomas Cook who ran a weekly excursion train
quickly to Wisconsin Dells which began to be dismissed and dis-
card Europe in July and August when all the shops of
Continental tourist destinations had closed.[7]

D. The Cook Tourist Train

[illegible] the Cook, Thomas's [illegible] excursions opened at
time Europe, not since [illegible] Christ opened [illegible] all of
Europe together [illegible] [illegible] Thomas [illegible] 1845 began to [illegible]
[illegible] England with the new [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
— a [illegible] Cook's [illegible] into [illegible] [illegible]
of all [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

— the [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], half
[illegible] of the [illegible] of [illegible].

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[7] Quoted in The World [illegible] 27 [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible].

> was a major factor in bringing about the removal of a dangerous threat to the security of the U.S.[8]

One of the most interesting analyses of the crisis is Henry M. Pachter's Collision Course, The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence. In this book the author beautifully shows how the strategy of conflict de facto worked. Pachter's purpose is to study the Cuban crisis as an "exercise in coexistence;" "to discover some of the rules that govern the diplomatic game under the conditions of an atomic stalemate."[9]

Pachter makes several points which appear valid, and are relevant to national security requirements:

(1) President Kennedy clearly defined and named the threat that had arisen, and spelled out precise action to cope with it. This, says Pachter, is leadership based on scientific thought.[10] (This is also implementation of the strategy of conflict.)

(2) Kennedy did not choose the strongest line of policy, but the minimum of demonstrative action; showing his opponent the danger but leaving the avenues of retreat open to him.[11]

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[8]DOD Annual Report for FY 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 7.

[9]Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course, The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. vii.

[10]Ibid., p. 85.

[11]Ibid., p. 86.

(3) The style in which the "victory" was won is significant. Courage, patience and decisiveness were displayed. (Here is the nonmilitary requirement of executive style at work.)

The above points are of the same tenor which Schelling expressed in his Strategy of Conflict. Reading Sachter's account, one quickly recognizes that this episode is truly a climax to the story of John F. Kennedy's conceptual views of national security policy:

> It began with a warning that looked like the forerunner of sterner measures, but it remained limited and controlled as an action; it compelled the enemy to retreat without driving him to despair; it left him just so much room for evasion that the sequel always remained at Kennedy's discretion. It had the beauty of a well-played hand or of a successful surgical operation.[12]

Whether President Kennedy had read Schelling's book or not,[13] he certainly believed in the "Strategy of Conflict" - here was bargaining, "mutual accommodation," winning in the sense of gaining relative to one's own value system and re-emphasis on the credibility of the potential force. The

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[12] Ibid., p. 87.

[13] Thomas Schelling, Professor, Harvard University. In a taped interview with the author 10 January 1967, Dr. Schelling stated that he did not know whether President Kennedy had read Strategy of Conflict, but that certainly Kennedy's advisors had read it, or drafts of the book.

Soviets were afforded the opportunity to choose, to choose without being driven to despair.

Beyond discussion of strategy in theoretical terms, the Cuban crisis gives us the opportunity to see many of the military and nonmilitary requirements. The military requirements of deterrence, selectivity and controlled use of force were all put to the test; the nonmilitary requirements of positivism, executive technique and primacy of the political were also vital concepts which helped determine U.S. policies regarding Cuba, October, 1962.

III. 1962 SUMMARY STATEMENT

An article on Defense Policies in a 1963 encyclopedia yearbook directly describes the importance of 1962 vis-a-vis national defense policy. ". . . Major shifts in U.S. defense policy, outlined soon after the Kennedy administration took office in 1961, became better defined during 1962."[14]

One might say that John F. Kennedy in 1962 (and possibly dating back to his Berlin policy) forcefully carried out the doctrine of flexible response which had developed so rapidly in the early months of 1961. The requirements did

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[14]John Gilbert Norris, "United States Defense Policies," Encyclopedia Britannica Yearbook, 1963 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.), p. 314.

not change during the year, rather they were reiterated with more confidence and conviction each time.

CHAPTER VII

THE LAST YEAR - 1963

In this chapter there is emphasis on achieving an overview of policy statements and strategic attitudes which prevailed during this final year. The requirements--the underpinning of the strategy-- are referred to both implicitly and explicitly throughout these statements.

I. THE GENERAL TONE

The State of the Union message, delivered 14 January 1963, conveyed feelings of thankfulness and hope; the state of the union was in fact "good." President Kennedy stressed many familiar points--the need for a domestically strong Nation; common defense through the alliance; the cry of the developing countries; the requirement for a superior defense system; the voice of disarmament.

The message began with a note of caution; ". . . This is the side of the hill, not the top," the President said. It ended with a ray of hope:

> . . . We steer our ship with hope, as Thomas Jefferson said, 'leaving fear astern'. Today we still welcome those winds of change--and we have every reason to believe that our tide is running strong. With thanks to Almighty God for seeing us through a

perilous passage, we ask His help anew
in guiding the good ship Union.[1]

National security requirements were clearly defined in the President's budget message for FY 1964, dated January 17, 1963. It was as if the McNamara statements in 1961 were being repeated. The requirements included:

(1) A strong strategic retaliatory force capable of surviving a surprise attack and responding effectively in a controlled and flexible manner against the aggressor--additional Minutemen and 6 more Polaris;

(2) improved air and missile defense forces;

(3) more powerful and flexible conventional forces;

(4) a civil defense fallout shelter program;

(5) strengthened counter-insurgency forces to help allies deal with Communist subversion.[2]

However, these two pronouncements do not convey the change in the conditions of both the domestic and international scene in 1963. Though the main elements of the national security policy remained, the strategy was to be affected by two important factors: (a) financial. There

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[1]John F. Kennedy, The State of the Union Message of the President, delivered 14 January 1963, Documents on American Foreign Relations 1963, Richard P. Stebbins, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 11.

[2]John F. Kennedy's Budget Message for FY 65, January 17, 1963, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963, Richard P. Stebbins, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 12-13.

was strong pressure to level off or cut the mounting defense budget, and, there prevailed an even more compelling administration drive to reduce U.S. gold outflow. (b) NATO friction. In 1963 there was a running dispute within NATO on various aspects of defense policy.

The tone set in Secretary McNamara's testimony before Congress was influenced greatly by these two factors. The requirements were still present; but the conditions of the times dictated the emphasis within those requirements. Flexible response was still the dominant principle, yet it was couched in conditions which had developed since 1961. For example, nonnuclear forces were vital to the strategy yet our NATO allies had to be called upon to help fulfill this requirement:

> . . . But we must continue to do everything in our power to persuade our Allies to meet their NATO force goals so that we will possess alternative capabilities for dealing with even larger Soviet attacks. And until these capabilities are achieved, the defense of Europe against an all-out Soviet attack, even if such an attack were limited to non-nuclear means, would require the use of tactical weapons on our part.[3]

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[3]Robert S. McNamara, Statement of Secretary of Defense before the Senate Sub-committee on DOD Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1964-68 Defense Program and the 1964 Defense Budget, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 54.

II. MAJOR SPEECHES - A BRIEF ANALYSIS

Perhaps the best test of the viability of the requirements which were developed in 1961 is analysis of a few of the major administration speeches in 1963:

On 10 June 1963, the President delivered a dynamic commencement address at American University, Washington, D.C. Throughout this speech, "Toward a Strategy of Peace," a familiar approach prevailed. This approach, one of optimism and hope, was to prove to be the ultimate manifestation of John F. Kennedy's executive style and of his belief in the strategy of conflict.

In his examination of the U.S. attitude toward peace, President Kennedy exuded confidence in attainment of such peace. The method, he said, was positive action and effective agreements. The bargaining process is clearly established as the method toward peace.

> . . . So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity.[4]

> . . . World peace, like community peace does not require that each man love his neighbors; it requires only that they live together in mutual tolerance,

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[4] Stebbins, ed., op. cit., p. 119.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

> submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement.[5]

Was this not the same reasoning that resolved the Cuban episode? In this bargaining process there must be more than one or two choices available. We "must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war."

Throughout 1963 President Kennedy continued to emphasize other basic nonmilitary requirements such as seen above in the American University speech (positive leadership; executive style). At the same time he tried to wrestle with conditions which affected such requirements. In his Frankfurt-aur Main speech 25 June 1963, for instance, he spoke of Atlantic partnership and its meaning, and of the need to drive toward a "more closely unified Atlantic deterrent." The keynote in this speech was confidence and hope, coupled with the need for reliance upon the strength and unity with the Alliance.[6] This policy, of course, was easier spoken than achieved.[7]

Throughout his 1963 speeches the President again and

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[5]Allan Nevins, ed., The Burden and the Glory (Chicago: Harper & Row, 1964), "Toward a Strategy of Peace": Commencement Address by President at American University, p. 55.

[6]Stebbins, op. cit., p. 206-208.

[7]For a lucid account of the problems facing the Alliance in these years refer: Henry A. Kissinger's The Troubled Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

again reminded the public of the continuing need for determination and resolve in our national security policy. He warned of the temptation to relax our posture. In thinking of peace we must think concurrently of our capacity to deter aggression and our goal of true disarmament.

The signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963 was significant fruition of the Kennedy emphasis upon disarmament and paths toward peace, an integrated part of his national security policy. In fact, it should not be overlooked that disarmament was included, from its inception, in the Kennedy national security strategy. However, for present purposes disarmament has not been considered as a basic requirement of the concept.

In his last speech, undelivered due to the tragedy in Dallas, President Kennedy had intended to speak about many of the same requirements. Speaking fundamentally of U.S. strength and security, he emphasized the need for conviction in our policy (P=SW). ". . . And when our strength and determination is clear, our words need merely to convey conviction, not belligerence. If we are strong, our strength will speak for itself. If we are weak, words will be of no help."[8]

The requirement of alliance with others in defending

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[8]Nevins, op. cit., p. 272.

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freedom was once again stated in this final speech. Interdependence even beyond the Alliance was included as a part of U.S. strength. Also, the requirement of strength at home was pointed up here.

One of the most important administration speeches on military policy was that delivered by Secretary McNamara 18 November 1963, just four days before the assassination. Within this speech are found many of the basic requirements which had been part of the original strategy and which had survived the test of time. Among these were:

(1) Combat readiness and mobility. ". . . But it is not only force size that matters. The key to the effective utilization of these forces (general purpose) is combat readiness and mobility."[9]

(2) Nuclear superiority/deterrent

> . . . If we were to consider a spectrum of the possible cases of Communist aggression and indirect challenge at one end of the scale to the massive invasion of Western Europe or a full scale nuclear strike against the West at the other, it is clear that our nuclear superiority has been and should continue to be an effective deterrent to aggression at the high end of the spectrum.[10]

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[9]Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 307.

[10]Ibid, p. 309-310.

(3) Selectivity. The Secretary stated the need for the right combination of forward deployment and highly mobile combat-ready ground, sea and air units, ". . . capable of prompt and effective commitment to actual combat."[11]

(4) And that last requirement--"The will to use those forces against Soviet troops and equipment."[12]

Thus, in 1963 all the requirements were interwoven throughout the speeches of Kennedy, McNamara and key administration figures. The framework was now clear and consistent.

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[11] Ibid, p. 311-312.

[12] Ibid, p. 312.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I. SUMMARY

In 1960 Defense Secretary McElroy was expounding before Congress the administration's basic national security policy framework. His concept was not far removed from that of John F. Kennedy: McElroy spoke of "the number one requirement" as being prepared for general war; he followed this with the requirement of being "in a position to apply whatever forces are needed in a situation of local conflict and apply them promptly," so that we may either deter or contain the enemy.[1] One could construe this latter statement as a policy of flexible response, roughly speaking.

In drawing conclusions based on this present study, one must attempt objectivity. Thus, perhaps an appropriate premise to this closing chapter is recognition that whatever the national security policy requirements conceived by the Kennedy administration, these were not new requirements.

In fact many of the Kennedy requirements stem directly

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[1] Raymond O'Connor, ed, American Defense Policy in Perspective, from Colonial Times to the Present, "An Overview of American Defense Policy," House of Representatives Report 408, Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1960, 86th Congress, 1st Session to accompany HR7454 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1965), p. 333-334.

from the principles of war which every trained military man understands. Listen to Sun Tzu, who was perhaps the first military strategist (approximately 6th century B.C.):

> . . . Thus the highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.[2]
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> . . . . . .
>
> . . . The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.[3]

It might well be asserted that President Kennedy was merely updating some very ancient strategic requirements. Many of the maxims of another great strategist, Napoleon, were no doubt read by Kennedy strategists. For instance, the command and control requirement was patently a part of General Bonaparte's strategy:

> . . . Nothing is more important in war than unity in command. When, therefore, you are carrying on hostilities against a single power only, you should have but one army acting on one line and led by one commander.[4]

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[2] Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips, USA, ed., Roots of Strategy, A Collection of Military Classics (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1940), p. 26.

[3] Ibid, p. 41-42. [4] Ibid, p. 427.

From Sun Tzu and Napoleon, one spans the years and realizes that the Eisenhower strategy, massive retaliation notwithstanding, was not too far from that of Kennedy, particularly the military requirements.

The significant difference in national security policy under Kennedy was that the conceptual requirements become a reality from the logistical standpoint; i.e., the weaponry and manpower were made ready and mobile. This took an increase in the defense budget as well as a reshuffling of monies within the various programs of the budget.

Another premise to recognize in drawing conclusions about the Kennedy strategic concept is the conditions of the times. Colonel Robert Ginsburgh in his book, U.S. Military Strategy in the Sixties, 1965, made a very valid, vivid point when he said, ". . . U.S. strategy has changed more in the last twenty years than it had in the previous one hundred and sixty five years of our history."[5] Colonel Ginsburgh listed many new factors which substantiate such a statement. They include (1) air power as the predominant strategic force; (2) increased vulnerability of all nations to enemy attack; (3) increased pace of warfare, and (4) communications technology.[6]

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[5]Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh, USAF, U.S. Military Strategy in the Sixties (New York: W. W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1965), p. 27.

[6]Ibid, p. 29-31.

Thus, with this changed arena in U.S. national strategy came the changed arena in requirements.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Recognizing the inherent restrictions upon a new administration, including past strategy and the conditions of the times, one can then decipher at least two basic conclusions regarding the Kennedy strategy and requirements therein: (1) The Kennedy Strategy developed quite rapidly; and, (2) throughout its development the strategy maintained a number of attributes, the most noteworthy being consistency, dynamism and totality.

The rapidity with which the strategy and attendent requirements were conceived is quite remarkable. In the March 1961 statement are points that withstood time and war. Yet, to be realistic one must conclude that the requirements, though partially established in the 1961 budget amendments, were not truly set until June/July 1961. That is, all the parts of the strategy of flexible response were present in the early months, but the complete strategy was not pieced together and operating as a whole until the summer, even for the President.

This general conclusion was concurred with by Professor Thomas Schelling this year. In a personal interview (mentioned above) Schelling emphasized two basic facts about the Kennedy

strategy. They were the rapidity with which it developed, and, secondly, the fact that it developed at all; i.e., consider the composition of the administration. The qualifications of Secretary McNamara, for example, did not include national military expertise--far from it.

In tracing the development of Kennedy's (national security policy) requirements, one senses that there was deep logic behind these requirements. Based upon the present study, one also senses that there were at least three constant attributes of the Kennedy strategy/requirements. Firstly, there was consistency. From the first budget amendment one sees the basic requirements being fulfilled; and of course as the strategy became clearer the consistency was even more evident.

Secondly, the strategy was dynamic and positive. The strategy has to fit the man--and John F. Kennedy was a doer, a driver, an action type if you will. It must also fit the times. President Kennedy felt that the U.S. had to pull itself out of its lethargic state and move toward strong leadership in the cause of peace - "Let us begin." All his major policy statements are crammed with positivism, as well as with optimism, above and beyond the natural degree expressed by great leaders.

Thirdly, totality was an attribute of the strategy. i.e., the strategy of flexible response and manifestation

thereof. The requirements were a complete package, each program jibing and working with another program. The success of this attribute was largely due to the genius of Secretary McNamara's management and planning techniques. The major innovations were introduced into the decision-making process of Department of Defense programming-planning-budgeting, and cost-effectiveness.

Charles J. Hitch, one of Mr. McNamara's right-hand men, best describes the beginnings of making "totality" work in his Decision Making for Defense:

> The initial development of the programming system, the second phase [of programming-planning-budgeting], was an enormous phase...
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> . . . . . .
>
> The problem here was to sort out all of the myriad programs and activities of the defense establishment and regroup them into meaningful program elements, i.e., integrated combinations of men, equipment, and installations whose effectiveness could be related to our national security objectives . . .[7]

The next task, continued Hitch, was to relate the program elements to the major missions of the Defense Department. And there was totality.

Consistency, dynamism, and totality--are three attributes which will be remembered of the Kennedy strategic concept.

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[7]Charles J. Hitch, Decision Making for Defense (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1965), p. 32.

The requirements of national security policy, as determined by the national strategy of flexible response under John F. Kennedy have been delineated, and subsequently explained by the historical method. The strategy from its early stages, and its theoretical base has been analyzed. That the requirements of national security policy, especially under the Kennedy concept of primacy of the political, originate from national strategy has become a part of this analysis. These requirements have been set forth in terms of the tangible (military) and the intangible (non-military).

The validity of the Kennedy doctrine and requirements was tested several times during the administration. The two most critical tests were Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962). And, the true validity of the doctrine was never more appropriately proved than in those crucial days of October 1962.

Another, more general, test of the requirements of the doctrine of flexible response was whether or not it did in fact "turn the tide" of events occurring within the international system in 1961. It is safe to reply that a communist offensive was stopped by those requirments: furthermore, there was a decided shift in the balance of the cold war by the end of the Kennedy administration. Some profess that a detente had come into being. Undoubtedly the requirements as determined by the Kennedy/McNamara/Taylor doctrine

directly helped to bring about the beginnings of a U.S./ Soviet detente within the international system.

One necessary last footnote: objectivity has been the goal throughout this study. Yet it must be frankly admitted that strong prejudice in favor of John F. Kennedy, the man, the President, precludes total objectivity. History alone will determine whether this man was a great president. But this writer will never let it be forgot:

> Don't let it be forgot
> That once there was a spot
> For a brief shining moment
> That was known as camelot.

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A P P E N D I X

APPENDIX A



THE KENNEDY CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY (PARADIGM)

THE STRATEGY CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY (PAGE 20)

APPENDIX B*

"The hour is late - but the agenda is long.

First - We must make invulnerable a nuclear retaliatory power second to none - by making possible now a stop-gap air alert and base dispersal program - and by stepping up development and production of the ultimate missiles that can close the gap and will not be wiped out in a surprise attack - Polaris, Minuteman and long-range air-to-ground missiles - meanwhile increasing our production of Atlas missiles, hardening our bases and improving our continental defense and warning systems. As a power which will never strike first, we require a retaliatory capacity based on hidden, moving or invulnerable weapons in such force as to deter any aggressor from threatening an attack he knows could not destroy enough of our force to prevent his own destruction . . .

Second - We must regain the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world - augmenting, modernizing and providing increased mobility and versatility for the conventional forces and weapons of the Army and Marine Corps. As long as those forces lack the necessary airlift and sealift capacity and versatility of firepower, we cannot protect our commitments around the globe - resist nonnuclear aggressions - or be certain of having enough time to decide on the use of our nuclear power.

Third - We must rebuild NATO into a viable and consolidated military force, capable of deterring any kind of attack, unified in weaponry and responsibility. Aiming beyond a narrow military alliance united only by mutual fears, a return to mutual consultation and respect - and a determined American effort to create a free world economy - can help overcome schismatic economic rivalries between the Continent and Britain, and the Common Market and the 'Outer Seven,' as well as other Western differences in military and political policy . . .

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*Senator John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, Allan Nevins (ed.), (New York: Harper & Bros, 1960), preface, no page number.

Fourth - We must, in collaboration with Western Europe and Japan, greatly increase the flow of capital to the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America - frustrating the Communist hopes for chaos in those nations - enabling emerging nations to achieve economic as well as political independence - and closing the dangerous gap that is now widening between our living standards and theirs. Above all, it is vital that we aid India to make a success of her new five-year program ...

Fifth - We must reconstruct our relations with the Latin-American democracies - bringing them into full Western partnership - working through a strengthened Organization of American States - increasing the flow of technical assistance, development capital, private investment, exchange students and agricultural surpluses, perhaps through the large-scale 'Operation Pan-America,' which has been proposed by the President of Brazil . . .

Sixth - We must formulate, with both imagination and restraint, a new approach to the Middle East - not pressing our case so hard that the Arabs feel their neutrality and nationalism are threatened, but accepting those forces and seeking to help channel them along constructive lines, while at the same time trying to hasten the inevitable Arab acceptance of the permanence of Israel . . .

Seventh - We must greatly increase our efforts to encourage the newly emerging nations of the vast continent of Africa - to persuade them that they do not have to turn to Moscow for the guidance and friendship they so desperately need - to help them achieve the economic progress on which the welfare of their people and their ability to resist Communist subversion depend. We can no longer afford policies which refuse to accept the inevitable triumph of nationalism in Africa . . .

Eighth - We must plan a long-range solution to the problems of Berlin. We must show no uncertainty over our determination to defend Berlin - but we must realize that a solution to the problems of that beleaguered city is only possible in the context of a solution of the problems of Germany and, indeed, the problems of all Europe. We must look forward to a free Berlin, in a united Germany in a Europe where tensions and armaments have been reduced . . .

Ninth - We must prepare and hold in readiness more flexible and realistic tools for use in Eastern Europe . . . We must now begin to work slowly and carefully toward programs designed to wean from their Soviet masters any dependents showing signs of discontent - to nourish the seeds of liberty in any cracks appearing in the Iron Curtain by reducing economic and ideological dependence on Russia . . .

Tenth - We must reassess a China policy which has failed dismally to move toward its principal objective of weakening Communist rule in the mainland - a policy which has failed to prevent a steady growth in Communist strength - and a policy which offers no real solution to the problems of a militant China . . .

Eleventh - We must begin to develop new, workable programs for peace and the control of arms. We have been unwilling to plan for disarmament, and unable to offer creative proposals of our own, always leaving the initiative in the hands of the Russians . . .

Twelfth and finally - We must work to build the stronger America on which our ultimate ability to defend the free world depends. We must increase our own scientific effort - not only by strengthening and revamping existing research programs in all fields, including the exploration of space - but by building an educational system which can produce the talent and skill on which our future strength and progress depend. We must work to create an America with an expanding economy, where growth is not dissipated in inflation, and consumer luxuries are not confused with national strength - an economy capable of supporting our massive needs and our new programs . . .

For all America - its President and its people - the coming years will be a time of decision. We must decide whether we have reached our limit - whether our greatness is past - whether we can go no further - or whether, in the words of Thomas Wolfe, 'the true discovery of America is before us - the true fulfillment of our mighty and immortal land is yet to come.'"

APPENDIX C**

Requirements of a Defense Program

"In order to meet this threat, the national defense program must be integrated with all other national programs. Its basic objective must be to maintain sufficient military strength to deal with both nuclear general war and aggression under conditions short of general war. The United States and its allies must be able to prevent war if possible, limit war if it occurs, and defeat any aggression that may threaten national interests. The requirements for such a defense program are:

* The maintenance of military technological superiority over the Communist bloc.

* Deterrent nuclear-delivery systems capable of effective retaliation against the enemy.

* A continental defense system, including both active and passive measures, strong enough to prevent the enemy from delivering a crippling blow upon the continental United States.

* Adequate forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force deployed abroad to meet our international obligations and backed by logistic support adequate for sustained combat.

* Ready forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force capable of intervening rapidly in areas where local aggression may occur. These ready forces should have the capability of employing nuclear weapons when, and to the extent, authorized by the President. Logistic support should be immediately available to support the deployment.

* Other ready forces of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force capable of rapidly reinforcing overseas units under conditions short of general war or in the event of general war. These forces also should have the capability of employing nuclear weapons, and provisions should be made to support them logistically in either a nonnuclear local war or a nuclear general war.

**Lieutenant Colonel Patrick W. Powers, U.S.A., A Guide To National Defense (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 5-6.

* Military- and economic-aid programs capable of developing indigenous strength and confidence in our allies and friends, and of assisting in the deterrence and defeat of Communist aggression.

* Reserve forces in the United States capable of rapid mobilization to replace ready forces committed against local aggression or to meet the needs of a nuclear general war.

* Sufficient stockpiles of equipment for the United States and selected allies to meet the requirements of war until wartime production becomes adequate.

* A war-production, mobilization, and training base to support a nuclear war."

APPENDIX E

TABLE 1
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
(In Billions of Dollars)

	FY 1961	FY 1962 Orig.	FY 1962 Final	FY 1963	FY 1964	FY 1965	FY 1966 Enacted[a] & Auth	FY 1966 SEA Suppl	FY 1966 Total	FY 1967
Strategic Offensive Forces		7.6	8.9	8.3	7.3	5.3	4.6	.5	5.1	5.1
Continental Air & Missile Defense Forces		2.2	2.3	1.9	2.0	1.6	1.7	-	1.7	1.4
General Purpose Forces		14.5	17.5	17.5	17.7	19.0	21.2	8.8	30.0	25.7
Airlift/Sealift Forces		.9	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.7	.5	2.2	2.1
Reserve and Guard Forces		1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.1	2.1	.1	2.2	2.4
Research and Development		3.9	4.2	5.1	5.4	4.9	5.2	.1	5.3	5.5
General Support		11.4	12.1	12.9	13.8	14.5	15.0	1.8	16.8	16.7
Retired Pay		.9	.9	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.6	-	1.6	1.8
Military Assistance		1.8	1.8	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.6	-	1.6	1.0
Total Obligational Authority	46.1	44.9	50.7	51.5	51.7	51.4	54.6	11.9	66.5	61.4
Less Financing Adjustments	-3.0	-1.3	-1.3	-.4	-.8	-.9	-3.6	+.4	-3.2	-1.5
New Obligational Authority	43.1	43.7	49.4	51.1	50.9	50.5	51.0	12.3	63.3	59.9
Adjustment to Expenditures	+1.6	+1.0	-1.2	-1.1	+.3	-3.1	-.7	-8.4	-9.1	1.6
Total Expenditures	44.7	44.7	48.2	50.0	51.2	47.4	50.3	3.9	54.2	58.3
TOA by Department & Agency										
Army	10.4	10.4	12.5	11.9	12.5	12.2	13.2	4.8	18.0	17.4
Navy	12.7	12.4	14.7	14.8	14.7	15.0	16.3	3.2	19.4	17.6
Air Force	19.9	18.5	19.7	20.5	20.2	19.6	19.7	3.7	23.4	21.5
Civil Defense			.3	.1	.1	.1	.1	-	.1	.1
Defense Agencies	.3	.4	.3	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.3	.2	1.6	1.5
Retired Pay	.8	.9	.9	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.6	-	1.6	1.8[b]
Defense Family Housing[c]	.5	.5	.5	.6	.7	.6	.7	-	.7	.5
Military Assistance	1.5	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.6	-	1.6	1.0
Total[d]	46.1	44.9	50.7	51.5	51.7	51.4	54.6	11.9	66.5	61.4